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Book Review
The Future of Copyright
FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY. By Lawrence
Lessig.† New York: The Penguin Press, 2004. Pp. xvii, 346.
$24.95.

Reviewed by Lawrence B. Solum*
Somebody once said: “Information wants to be free.”1
—Roger Clarke
There’s no such thing as a free lunch.2
—Alvin Hansen
I.

Introduction: Idea Slingers and Norm Entrepreneurs

Sometimes technological change is so profound that it rocks the
foundations of an entire body of law. Peer-to-peer (P2P) filesharing
systems—Napster, Gnutella, KaZaA, Grokster, and Freenet3—are mere
† C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.
* Copyright © 2005 Lawrence A. Solum. Professor of Law, University of San Diego.
Readers familiar with my traditional academic work are likely to notice that this Review is just a
little bit unusual, departing in ways large and small from the rather plodding, methodical, and
analytic stuff that I usually write. I am grateful to the editors of the Texas Law Review for
convincing me to turn a series of blog (or weblog) posts on Legal Theory Blog into this Review.
For the originals, see Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Bookclub: Free Culture by Lawrence
Lessig, http://lsolum.blogspot.com (including link on sidebar, “Legal Theory Bookclub: Lessig’s
Free Culture,” with hyperlink to first of eight posts).
Permission is hereby granted for noncommercial reproduction of this Review in whole or in part
for educational or research purposes, including the making of multiple copies for classroom use,
subject only to the condition that the name of the author, a complete citation to this publication of
the Review, and this copyright notice and grant of permission be included in the copies.
1. Roger Clarke, Information Wants to be Free . . . , at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/
Roger.Clarke/II/IWtbF.html (last modified Aug. 28, 2001). The origin of the phrase is obscure. A
precursor, “Information should be free,” has been attributed to Peter Samson, a member of the MIT
Tech Model Railroad Club. “Information wants to be free” is usually attributed to Stewart Brand.
Id.
2. See Contributing to the History of Words and Ideas, JSTORNEWS para. 3, at
http://www.jstor.org/news/2000.11/words.link.html (Nov. 2000) (noting a “1952 article in the
journal Ethics [that] attributes the saying to ‘Professor Alvin Hansen in his famous TINSTAAFL
formula—“There’s no such thing as a free lunch”’”); see also ROBERT HEINLEIN, THE MOON IS A
HARSH MISTRESS (Tor 1996) (1966); MILTON FRIEDMAN, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS A FREE
LUNCH (1975). The origin of the phrase is obscure.
3. See Peer-to-Peer, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/peer-to-peer (last visited Nov. 13, 2004)
(listing those five systems as implementing P2P filesharing).
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symptoms of a set of technological innovations that have set in motion an
ongoing process of fundamental changes in the nature of copyright law. The
video tape recorder begat the Sony “substantial noninfringing use” defense.4
The digital cassette recorder begat the Audio Home Recording Act.5 The
internet begat the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.6 Napster begat
Napster.7 We see the law morph right in front of our eyes, but its ultimate
form is still obscure. As a consequence, the future of copyright is up for
grabs. We live in a magical, exhilarating, and frightening time: Many
alternative copyfutures8 shimmer on the horizon, sometimes coming into
sharper focus and sometimes fading away.
In this heady atmosphere, the idea slingers are at work. Richard Posner
and William Landes have proposed indefinitely renewable copyrights.9 Neil
Netanel,10 William Fisher,11 and others propose to legalize P2P filesharing
and replace the lost revenues with a tax on hardware and internet service.
Joseph Liu suggests that the scope of fair use should grow with time.12 Mark
Lemley is debunking ex post justifications for intellectual property.13 No
surprise, the academics do not have a monopoly on idea slinging. The
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA) have gone on the offensive, proposing
legislation like the “Induce Act,” targeted at shutting down P2P filesharing
services that allow third parties to share copyrighted content.14

4. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 428 (1984) (holding that the
sale of tape recorders and photocopying machines does not constitute contributory infringement
because they are “capable of substantial noninfringing uses,” and “have substantial benefit for some
purposes”).
5. Audio Home Recording Act, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4242 (1992) (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2000)).
6. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
7. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
8. By copyfutures, I mean to refer to the possible future states of copyright law. For the
neologism “copyfutures,” see Copyfutures, at http://lsolum.typepad.com/copyfutures (last visited
Nov. 13, 2004) (pointing to a blog on the future of copyright).
9. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 471 (2003); see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 210–49 (2003).
10. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-toPeer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003).
11. See WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF
ENTERTAINMENT 199–258 (2004) (proposing a system in which the government would pay
copyright holders a share of such tax revenues based on the relative popularity of their creations).
12. See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409 (2002).
13. Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 129, 132 (2004).
14. Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004).
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In a very real sense, we are in the midst of an intellectual, moral, and
legal struggle over the future of copyright. Intellectually, the “copyfight,”15
the struggle over the future of the rights to duplicate and transform
information, takes place in the realm of ideas—between the covers of law
reviews, in position papers, on editorial pages, and online in the
blogosphere.16 Legally, major skirmishes have already occurred in the
federal courts, from the United States Supreme Court’s decision to uphold
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA)17 in Eldred v.
Ashcroft18 to the recent split between the Seventh19 and Ninth Circuits20 over
the question whether P2P filesharing services are contributory copyright
infringers. Heated copyfighting takes place in the back rooms of Congress
and elsewhere inside the beltway, where the consumer electronic industry
recently refused to come to terms with the RIAA and the MPAA over the
terms of the Induce Act.21 Last, but not least, the copyfight includes a moral
and ideological battle for the hearts and minds of an increasingly global
public. The RIAA and the MPAA labor (mostly without success) to
convince a generation that has grown up ripping, burning, and downloading
that the use of a P2P filesharing program is the moral equivalent of
shoplifting a CD.22
No copywarrior is more prominent and influential than Larry Lessig.
Lessig was the brilliant architect of Eric Eldred’s failed challenge to the
CTEA’s retroactive twenty-year extension of copyright terms—effectively a

15. See Copyfight, at http://www.corante.com/copyfight/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2004) (pointing
to a blog focusing on copyright issues); A Copyfighter’s Musings, at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
cmusings/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2004) (same).
16. The blogosphere is the interconnected world of blogs.
See Blogosphere, at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/blogosphere (last visited Nov. 13, 2004) (defining the term).
17. See Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (1994)). The Act was passed by both the House and Senate on
October 7, 1998 and signed by President Clinton on October 27, 1998.
18. 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003).
19. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651–63 (7th Cir. 2003) (concluding that
sufficient evidence existed for a preliminary injunction against Aimster, the internet provider of a
P2P filesharing service, due to a likely finding of contributory copyright infringement).
20. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004) (affirming a district court holding that the distributors of P2P
filesharing software were not contributory copyright infringers because they did not have
knowledge of the copyright infringement and did not materially contribute to the copyright
infringement).
21. Katie Dean, Senate Shelves Induce Review, WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/
news/politics/0,1283,65255,00.html (Oct. 7, 2004).
22. See Privacy & Piracy: The Paradox of Illegal File-Sharing on Peer-to-Peer Networks and
the Impact of Technology on the Entertainment Industry: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm.
on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 108th Cong. 82 (Sept. 30, 2003) (statement
of Mitch Bainwol, Chairman & CEO, RIAA) (“The music industry has, for a number of years,
undertaken a massive campaign to educate consumers regarding the illegality of the unauthorized
distribution of copyrighted music online.”).
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twenty-year moratorium on new works entering the public domain.23 (Just
getting Eldred to the Supreme Court was no mean accomplishment; getting
votes to strike down the CTEA was truly remarkable.) Lessig is an idea
slinger par excellance, the author of Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace24
and The Future of Ideas25—enormously influential books. And now the
litigator and idea slinger has remade himself as a “norm entrepreneur”26—a
public figure with the towering ambition of reshaping “copynorms”27—the
fundamental set of social norms that shape perceptions of the morality of
filesharing and the legitimacy of legislation that shrinks the public domain.
Lessig’s most sustained attempt to reshape copynorms is his most recent
book, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock
Down Culture and Control Creativity.28 The title gives it away. Free
Culture is no academic exercise. And Lessig is remarkably frank about this:
My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don’t want to
plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
obscure French theorists—however natural that is for the weird sort
we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
simple ideas can be more fully understood.29
Free Culture wants to win hearts and minds for a great cause—a radical
paradigm shift from corporate culture to free culture, from selling to sharing,
and from intellectual property to intellectual commons. Just when it looked
like our copyfuture would be dominated by a few giant media
conglomerates—vast integrated empires of publishing, music distribution,
and motion picture production—Lessig announces a future modeled on the
open-source software movement, a future in which small-scale enterprises
and individuals build a vast intellectual commons dedicated to the
propositions that information shall be free and ideas shall not be owned.

23. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186.
24. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
25. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED
WORLD (2002).
26. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996)
(originating the phrase “norm entrepreneur”); see also Dorothea Kübler, On the Regulation of
Social Norms, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 449, 449–50 (2001) (developing a model analyzing how
norms are influenced by “‘norm entrepreneurs’ such as lawmakers, government agencies, [and]
unions”), available at http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/wt1/papers/2001/norms.pdf. I am grateful to
David McGowan for discussion on this point.
27. For the definition of the term “copynorm,” see Copynorms, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Copynorms (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
28. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW
TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004) [hereinafter LESSIG, FREE
CULTURE].
29. Id. at 13.
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Because Lessig’s method of exposition is unusual for the kind of book
usually reviewed in these pages, so shall be the approach of this Review.
Lessig tells stories. The Review will nudge, worry, and pick at the stories
that Lessig tells. Along the way, I hope to illuminate Lessig’s themes and
raise some questions about his conclusions. Of the stories that Lessig tells,
some work and some don’t. Of the conclusions that Lessig draws from his
stories, some follow and some don’t. In the end, I hope to draw out some
large implications from Lessig’s tales of free culture. Like Lessig, I will
adopt a somewhat breezy tone, but unlike Lessig, I shall be aiming at
academic rigor.
This Review is about Free Culture, the book and the ideas for which it
stands. In Part II, we will take a look at the phrase “free culture” itself,
attempting to glean the central idea of Free Culture, the book. Part III takes
a look at Lessig’s indictment of the big media companies and the power that
copyright law gives them over public culture. In Part IV, we look at Lessig’s
arguments that “piracy” can actually be a good thing, and, in Part V, we see
how he applies those ideas to P2P filesharing. Part VI investigates Lessig’s
arguments about the social costs of intellectual property rights; Part VII
adumbrates his four-part typology of laws, markets, norms, and architecture
as the modalities of regulation. In Part VIII, we look at Lessig’s discussion
of the relationship between copyrights and copynorms, and in Part IX, we
examine Lessig’s postmortem on the Eldred v. Ashcroft case. In Part X, we
take a brief look at Lessig’s proposals for the future of copyright. Part XI
concludes. Free Culture is a sprawling book, and this is a sprawling Review.
II.

Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose

What does the phrase “Free Culture”—the dominant motif of Lessig’s
book—really mean? In the preface, Lessig gives a hint about what is to
come:
[W]e come from a tradition of “free culture”—not “free” as in “free
beer” (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the freesoftware
movement), but “free” as in “free speech,” “free markets,” “free
trade,” “free enterprise,” “free will,” and “free elections.” A free
culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
opposite of a free culture is a “permission culture”—a culture in which
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creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful, or of
creators from the past.30
And he clarifies his position:
[A]n argument for free culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to
avoid, and even harder to understand. A free culture is not a culture
without property; it is not a culture in which artists don’t get paid. A
culture without property, or in which creators can’t get paid, is
anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not what I advance here.
Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract that
get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted if its
property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered by
extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I fear
about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this book is
written.31
These passages reveal something important about the aim of Free
Culture. Rhetoric and not rigorous argument is the currency of the norm
entrepreneur. And quite naturally, academic readers will get a bit antsy
about the looseness of Lessig’s arguments and the imprecision of his
language. “Free will” and “free markets” aren’t really “free” in the same
sense.32 “A balance between anarchy and control”—that’s a nice phrase, but
what does it really mean?
Let me be clear. Academic standards are surely not the only valid
standards. Fine rhetoric can play an important social role—opening minds
and hearts to new possibilities. If Free Culture succeeds as a political tract,
it will be a success on its own terms. If Free Culture does more—if it is a
political tract that advances important and enduring new ideas—then it will
be in proud company with Cato’s Letters and the Federalist Papers, to name
just two exemplars of persuasive writing that transcend the pejorative phrase
“mere rhetoric.”
Another important clue to the meaning and method of Free Culture
comes in its Introduction. Free Culture persuades by telling stories, and
Lessig’s first story is a doozy that vividly illustrates the connection between
technological change and legal change. The story is about the Wright
brothers and the invention of the airplane.33 The advent of the airplane
30. Id. at xiv (footnote omitted).
31. Id. at xvi.
32. The phrase “free will” comes from the free-will/determinism debate in the philosophy of
mind. The term “free” in “free will” means something like “not casually determined.” The term
“free” in “free markets” means something like “not regulated.” Unregulated and undetermined are
two quite different ideas.
33. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 1–2.
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created a new problem for property law. The Latin maxim “cujus est solum
ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos” means, “To whomsoever the soil
belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the depths.”34 A mechanical
application of this doctrine would create a “tragedy of the anticommons”35
for air travel: Airplanes would be trespassers and, given the huge number of
individual property owners from whom permissions would need to be
obtained, air travel would be practically impossible.36 But this rule gave way
in the face of the new technology of air travel in United States v. Causby,37 in
which Justice Douglas wrote:
[The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a public
highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true, every
transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass
suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize such private
claims to the airspace would clog these highways, seriously interfere
with their control and development in the public interest, and transfer
into private ownership that to which only the public has a just claim.38
Lessig uses Causby to tell a story about the relationship between
technological change and legal change. He claims that the quoted passage
from Causby shows how technological change is translated into legal change
by instrumentalist judging:
This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas’s
style not to dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages
to reach the conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: “Common
sense revolts at the idea.” But whether it takes pages or a few words,
it is the special genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the
law adjusts to the technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it

34. Drummond v. White Oak Fuel, 140 S.E. 57, 59–61 (1927); see also 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 18 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1902)
(discussing the cujus est solum doctrine); 1 EDWARDO COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND; OR, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON ch. 1, § 1(4)(a) (Charles Butler ed., 1832)
(same); 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 621 (John M. Gould ed., 14th ed.
1896) (asserting that “land” as one’s property “has an indefinite extent, upwards as well as
downwards, so as to include everything terrestrial, under or over it”).
35. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx
to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); see also Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1165, 1214–18 (1967) (discussing the ethical considerations that justify waiving “just
compensation” for Congress’s legislating “navigable airspace” into the public domain).
36. Of course, Congress might have created mandatory easements and then compensated
property owners. Or, common law courts might have defined “sky” in a way that excluded the
flyable airspace above the usable airspace.
37. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
38. Id. at 261.
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changes. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age crumble in
another.39
One might quibble at this point. First, the passage that Lessig cites was
not actually the basis for the decision in Causby. The very next sentences in
the opinion read, “But that general principle does not control the present
case. For the United States conceded on oral argument that if the flights over
respondents’ property rendered it uninhabitable, there would be a taking
compensable under the Fifth Amendment.”40 Justice Douglas’s neat turn of
phrase was obiter dicta and not part of the reasoning in support of Causby’s
holding.
Second, and more fundamentally, this is not “how the law usually
works”—not even close. Justice Douglas was the über-realist—a Supreme
Court justice who cared not a whit for what the law required and everything
for his own ideas about what the law should be.41 Courts rarely reverse
centuries of precedent simply because the judges who sit on the court believe
that the rules are contrary to their own preferences about what the law ought
to say. There is a relationship between technological change and legal
change, but it is a more complex relationship than suggested by the story that
Lessig tells about Causby.
But I said “quibble,” and I meant it. Let’s not miss the forest for the
trees. Lessig’s Causby story is designed to “pump” certain intuitions42—to
put us in the right frame of mind for what is to come. Technological
changes—digitization, the internet, P2P filesharing, and the rest—bear a
relationship to copyright law that is similar to the relationship that air travel
bore to the cujus est solum doctrine in property law. Lessig’s story is
designed to soften us up, to prepare us for the possibility that intellectual
property will need to give way to a new technological reality if the public
interest is to be served. Law must be responsive to the needs of technology
and progress if our culture is to be free.

III. The Big Bad Media Companies
Early in the book, Lessig tells another marvelous story—the
illuminating tale of Edwin Howard Armstrong, who invented FM radio.43
Free Culture recounts the tale of Armstrong’s battle with RCA, which
attempted to suppress Armstrong’s superior technology in order to protect its
39. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 2–3.
40. Causby, 328 U.S. at 261.
41. See generally BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O.
DOUGLAS (2004).
42. On “pumping intuitions,” see generally DANIEL C. DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM: THE
VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH WANTING 12 (1984) (describing the abuse by some authors of
intuition pumps, which serve to focus the reader’s attention on the big picture at the expense of
hard-to-follow details).
43. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 3–6.
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market position in AM radio. Another good story, and again Lessig is
making vivid a general point about law and technology. Stakeholders in the
status quo will use the law—both fairly and unfairly—to protect their
interests, even at the expense of progress that is manifestly in the public
interest.
Lessig ties some of these ideas together towards the end of the
Introduction:
I have become increasingly amazed by the power of this idea of
intellectual property and, more importantly, its power to disable
critical thought by policy makers and citizens. There has never been a
time in our history when more of our “culture” was as “owned” as it is
now. And yet there has never been a time when the concentration of
power to control the uses of culture has been as unquestioningly
accepted as it is now.
The puzzle is, Why?
Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value and
importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it because
we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an absolute
claim was wrong?
Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective
intuitions?44
Maybe. Maybe Lessig is right and we are simply bewitched by the idea
of intellectual property or manipulated by media giants into accepting strong
copyright laws. But maybe not. Stories are not arguments. Large corporations are easy targets: They are hardly warm and fuzzy. But one story does
not an argument make. Big companies, big governments, and even “little
guys”—history is full of villainous behavior by actors of all sorts, big and
small, public and private. Not every story about a big company and an
individual has the big company as the villain and the individual as the hero.
From the fact that RCA attempted to suppress FM radio to the detriment of
the public interest, it does not follow that the RIAA and the MPAA are
wrong to combat P2P filesharing.
IV. Larry and the Pirates45
Free Culture is divided into parts, and the first five chapters are lumped
together in a part titled Piracy. Piracy is an important rhetorical trope in
debates about P2P filesharing. If the rights created by copyright were just
44. Id. at 12.
45. With apologies to Terry and the Pirates, the beloved cartoon strip. For a brief introduction
to the cartoon, see generally James F. Widner, Terry and the Pirates, at http://www.otr.com/
terry_pirate.html (last modified Dec. 7, 2003).
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like rights in tangible property, then unauthorized copying would be like
theft. And if the internet were like the high seas, a zone outside the territory
of any nation state, then P2P filesharers could be analogized to modern-day
pirates—a common enemy of all civilized peoples. In the piracy chapters,
Lessig succeeds in undermining the piracy trope. Piracy does not create new
value, but borrowing from copyrighted works is a time honored method of
creating things that are new and valuable. Lessig’s success is largely a
function of the stories that he tells, and this Part of the Review will take a
careful look at the conclusion that Lessig draws from the tales he tells.
In the introductory interlude that begins the chapters on piracy, Lessig
takes aim at the rhetoric of those who campaign against P2P filesharing in
order to protect copyright. Of course, we are familiar with the rhetorical
moves. P2P users are thieves and pirates. But Lessig thinks that this rhetoric
is built on an implausible assumption:
Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon the
creative work of others, I am taking from them something of value.
Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I should have
their permission. The taking of something of value from someone else
without permission is wrong. It is a form of piracy.46
Lessig then makes a crucial move. This move has been made before,
but Lessig makes it deftly and clearly. He distinguishes reproduction from
transformation:
[There is] a distinction that the law no longer takes care to draw—the
distinction between republishing someone’s work on the one hand and
building upon or transforming that work on the other. Copyright law
at its birth had only publishing as its concern; copyright law today
regulates both.
Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn’t matter
all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
entities could bear the burden of the law—even the burden of the
Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
more expense of doing business.
But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
commercial creators but effectively that of anyone.47
Of course, self-publishing predates the internet. The cassette tape
recorder empowered everyone with modest means to create their own new
works—compilation tapes. The photocopy machine empowered ordinary
instructors to produce their own new works—course materials. P2P
46. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 18.
47. Id. at 19.
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filesharing goes one giant step further—it empowers everyone to distribute
works in digital form. If I made a compilation tape, I could make copies for
a few friends. If I were a fanatic, I could make and distribute copies to a few
hundred friends and strangers at a substantial cost in time and materials. P2P
distribution, however, reaches the whole world, and the copies that are distributed can be recopied and redistributed with almost zero loss of fidelity to
the original. Through computer applications such as KaZaA or Grokster, my
ability to share is limited only by the processing capacity of my computer
and the bandwidth of my connection to the internet.
These are truly revolutionary changes—transformations that upset the
basic premises upon which copyright law and copynorms are predicated.
Traditional copyright law is premised on the idea that copying technologies
are expensive and centralized. The historical paradigm of copying
technology is the printing press—a big piece of machinery that might be
acquired by a small business but not by an ordinary household. The law is
pretty good at finding and controlling a relatively small number of big
machines. The combination of the personal computer and the internet
changes that paradigm profoundly. A typical household now has a set of
devices that equal the printing press, a record stamping plant, and film
production facility, connected to a low-cost worldwide distribution network.
We all have a set of “burglary tools” for intellectual property “theft” on a
massive scale. But is the unauthorized copying of a copyrighted work really
theft? And even if it is theft as a matter of law, should it be?
In Chapter 1, Lessig tells two very compelling stories about the value
created by copying. The first story is about Walt Disney. Lessig argues that
the early history of Disney’s creative output was based on derivative works.48
Early Disney cartoons borrowed from, parodied, and mimicked a variety of
works. Some were in the public domain like Snow White, while others were
relatively new works, still in copyright—for example, Steamboat Willie
ripped off Steamboat Bill, Jr., a Buster Keaton film.49
The second story is about doujinshi—a form of Japanese comic book in
which a source comic is reworked and transformed.50 Japanese copyright
law is not so different than the copyright laws of the United States.51 So,
quite naturally, Lessig asks why the owners of the originals don’t sue:
It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if doujinshi are
permitted rather than banned, but that doesn’t explain why individual
copyright owners don’t sue nonetheless. If the law has no general
exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases individual manga
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 21–25.
Id.
Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 26.
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artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not a more general
pattern of blocking this “free taking” by the doujinshi culture?
I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question as
often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by a
friend from a major Japanese law firm. “We don’t have enough
lawyers,” he told me one afternoon. There “just aren’t enough
resources to prosecute cases like this.”52
I think that something else is going on. If just some of the producers of
doujinshi comic books were sued or prosecuted, this might have a deterrent
effect. You don’t have to bring a suit against each and every infringer to
enforce the law. I suspect that the doujinshi phenomenon is better explained
by copynorms—the informal social attitudes that create expectations about
what is “okay” and what is socially unacceptable. Doujinshi are permitted by
Japanese copynorms. Because these norms are internalized, the question that
Lessig asked—“Why don’t you sue?”—is not a question that even arises
from within the culture.
Copynorms are the sea we swim in when we think about copyright law.
We don’t see them, except when they begin to break down or change.
Doujinshi are okay: they are within the accepted bounds of behavior. P2P
filesharing is a bit different. P2P filesharing did not creep up on us, altering
norms as it went.
P2P filesharing exploded, creating a big-bang
transformation of copybehavior. In one segment of the culture, college
dorms and teenage bedrooms, the copynorms went one way: This is just
sharing; it’s like swapping compilation cassette tapes. In the IP industry, not
unexpectedly, copynorms went another way: This is just theft; it’s like
running a pirate CD pressing plant. Which version of copynorms will
prevail? The norms embraced by the Napster generation or the norms
pushed by the MPAA and the RIAA? This battle over copynorms is
paramount to the shape of copybehavior and copyright law in the future.
Lessig offers yet another story, designed to elicit libertarian copynorms.
Chapter 2 of Free Culture is called Mere Copyists, and it begins with another
doozy of a story—George Eastman’s development of the roll-film camera.53
Lessig’s important point is about the legal environment that was an essential
prerequisite for photography to flourish:
What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
Eastman’s genius was an important part. But also important was the
legal environment within which Eastman’s invention grew. For early
in the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,

52. Id. at 27.
53. Id. at 31–32.
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required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
he wanted. Their answer was no.54
The Coase Theorem predicts that in an environment of zero transaction
costs, the initial allocation of entitlements will not affect how resources are
used.55 In the photography case and in the case of P2P copying of music or
video, the zero transaction costs assumption does not hold.56 And hence the
choice of entitlement-assigning rules may determine whether the efficient
outcomes are reached.
Photography is a very clever example for Lessig. Copynorms
concerning photography are well established. Everyone “knows” that
photographing a building that belongs to someone else is okay, in the deep
sense that widely held social norms permit and protect the practice of
photography.
Photographers, professionals and amateurs alike, may
rightfully photograph people, places, and things without obtaining
permission from the subject or owner.57 Law and social norms could have
branded photographers as “pirates,” but they didn’t.
Rhetorically, then, the photography story is effective, but it doesn’t
really work as an argument. There is a very real difference between
photography and filesharing. The subjects of photography are not (usually)
created for the purpose of being photographed. That is not to say that the
subjects are not created. Buildings are built, and you don’t have to be a
supermodel to choose your ensemble with care. But buildings are not built
for the purpose of being photographed. We don’t choose our outfits on the
off chance that someone might take a snapshot in which we might appear.
But music is often recorded so that copies can be sold. Films are made so
that they can be exhibited and sold on DVD. Books are written so that they
will be purchased in bookshops. There is a fundamental disanalogy between
photographing someone else’s property and ripping and uploading someone
else’s song. That disanalogy may be quite relevant to the question whether
the label “pirate” should be applied to photographers or filesharers. Indeed,
the photography story can be turned around because, as Lessig understands,
photographers don’t just copy information, they create it: Each photograph
brings new information into the world. And if photographs themselves were
not protected by copyright law, the effect might be a diminished production
54. Id. at 33.
55. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
56. The real world is almost always characterized by positive transaction costs, to the profit of
transactional lawyers everywhere.
57. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977) (stating that there is no tort
for photographing a person in public because “his appearance is public and open to the public eye”);
17 U.S.C. § 120(a) (2000) (“The copyright in an architectural work that has been constructed does
not include the right to prevent the making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings,
photographs, or other pictorial representations of the work, if the building in which the work is
embodied is located in or ordinarily visible from a public place.”).
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of fine photography—a result that would make the world less aesthetically
rich.
Lessig’s next story goes to exactly this point of disanalogy—what we
might call the question of incentives to produce information. Are strong
copyright law and strong copynorms necessary in order to provide adequate
incentives to produce information? The next story is about the “free
software” (FS) (or “open-source software” (OSS)) movement. And this story
is really the master story of Free Culture:
FS/OSS is software whose source code is shared. Anyone can
download the technology that makes a FS/OSS program run. And
anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of FS/OSS technology
works can tinker with the code.
This opportunity creates a “completely new kind of learning
platform,” as Brown describes. “As soon as you start doing that,
you . . . unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people
can start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if
they can improve it.” Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. “Open
source becomes a major apprenticeship platform.”58
Linux is, of course, the prime example—the rock star of the free-software
movement. Linux prospers even though the Linux kernel is free—
downloadable at no charge.59
One point of this story is that free copying is not inimical to the creation
of open-source software. Of course, this does not suggest that there is a free
lunch when it comes to software. After all, someone pays for all that Linux
programming in foregone leisure time, foregone company time, or in some
other way. The point, rather, is that as long as someone is willing to pay for
lunch, not everyone needs to pay.
The larger lesson of Chapter 2 is that copying (and remixing) content
can be a powerful engine of creativity. Lessig ends the chapter, however,
with a note of pessimism: “We’re building a technology that takes the magic
of Kodak, mixes moving images and sound, and adds a space for
commentary and an opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But
we’re building the law to close down that technology.”60 What law does
Lessig have in mind? The most likely candidate is the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act,61 but because Lessig doesn’t try for the precision of scholarly
writing, we may never know exactly what he meant.

58. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 46.
59. For a brief history of Linux, see the Linux website at http://www.linux.org/info/index.html
(last visited Jan. 11, 2005).
60. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 47.
61. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
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Lessig offers yet another story on the theme of piracy. And it is a
spectacular story! Lessig tells the tale of Jesse Jordan, a student at
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI), who developed a very effective
search engine for the files on RPI’s network.62 The search engine listed all of
the hundreds of thousands of files on the network—including MP3-format
and other types of music files.63 The catalog of files included lots of other
stuff—about seventy-five percent other stuff—but nonetheless the RIAA was
not amused.64 Jesse Jordan was served with a complaint, and the RIAA
demanded all of his savings in exchange for dropping the suit against him.65
The story of Jesse Jordan is an example of the filesharing phenomenon,
where all of the equities and most of our moral intuitions are on the side of
the defendant. Jesse Jordan looks like an innocent victim of the big bad
media companies. If you are knowledgeable about copyright doctrine, you
are likely to agree that Jordan has a compelling legal defense to the lawsuit
filed against him—he wasn’t filesharing. He just created a search engine—
the kind of software that we use all the time for many different purposes. If
anyone deserves a Sony “substantial noninfringing uses” defense,66 surely it
is Jordan. His story engages all of our sympathy on the side of the filesharers
and against the content owners.
But precisely because Jordan’s story is so compelling, it can be used to
illustrate many points—not all of which serve the agenda of Free Culture. In
particular, as Lessig tells the tale, it is first and foremost a story about the
distorting effects of litigation costs on the system of civil litigation.
Ultimately, Jordan lost because he could not afford the $250,000 it might
have cost to successfully assert his defenses.67 The distorting influence of
litigation costs on the effects of copyright law ought to be taken seriously.
But many readers will draw a different lesson from the story—the lesson that
the RIAA is a bad actor. Pumping that intuition may be effective rhetoric,
but it is not a necessarily rigorous argument for an obvious reason: Just
because the RIAA goes over the top does not mean that the policies the
RIAA defends are not in the public interest. Ad hominem arguments are
usually bad ones.
Ad hominem argument plays a role in Lessig’s next point about piracy:
If “piracy” means using the creative property of others without their
permission—if “if value, then right” is true—then the history of the
62. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 48–52.
63. Id. at 49–50.
64. Id. at 50.
65. Id. at 50–52 (noting that the RIAA’s initial demand of at least $15 million in damages was
lowered to Jordan’s life savings, $12 thousand, to dismiss the case).
66. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (holding that the sale
of copying equipment does not constitute contributory infringement if it is “capable of substantial
noninfringing uses”).
67. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 51–52.
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content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of “big
media” today—film, records, radio, and cable TV—was born of a kind
of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation’s
pirates join this generation’s country club—until now.68
He begins with film, telling the story of motion-picture production
companies that fled the East Coast for California in order to avoid Thomas
Edison’s patents.69 He moves next to the more complicated story of the
sound-recording industry. Lessig points out that in the early days of the
technology, it wasn’t clear whether sound recordings infringed sheet-music
copyrights. A battle over the content of the law ensued, pitting content
proprietors against the purveyors of the new technology:
The innovators who developed the technology to record other
people’s works were “sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
genius of American composers,” and the “music publishing industry”
was thereby “at the complete mercy of this one pirate.” As John
Philip Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, “When they make
money out of my pieces, I want a share of it.”70
We know how the conflict was resolved—the Copyright Act was
amended, extending protection to sound recordings—but this protection was
limited in a way that is extremely important to Lessig’s argument against a
permission-based system of intellectual property:
But rather than simply granting the composer complete control over
the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave recording
artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress, once the
composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of copyright
law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer authorizes a
recording of his song, others are free to record the same song, so long
as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.71
And this precedent has been appropriated by a variety of scholars as the
basis for proposals to set up a similar scheme for P2P filesharing. Neil
Netanel, for example, has argued that the benefits of P2P filesharing can be
preserved by establishing a tax on hardware (such as MP3 players and
computers) and then paying out the proceeds to the copyright owners based
on their pro rata share of downloads (which would be sampled or
monitored).72
These stories about piracy by the ancestors of the RIAA and the MPAA
certainly pump a set of intuitions.73 “That’s not fair”—the reader is likely to
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 53.
Id. at 53–55.
Id. at 56 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 56–57.
Netanel, supra note 10, at 4–7.
See generally DENNETT, supra note 42, at 12 (explaining “pumping of intuitions”).
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think—if piracy was allowed for film, recorded music, radio, and cable, then
it ought to be allowed for P2P filesharing. But why? Two wrongs don’t
make a right. We might use the same stories to pump quite a different
intuition. Copyright owners have been wronged before—by the recording
industry, the broadcast industry, and the cable television industry—and the
time has come to put this pattern of piracy to an end! In a more
consequentialist vein, we might ask Lessig the counterfactual question: What
would have happened if copyright had been respected (or extended at an
earlier stage) in each of these prior eras of piracy? I don’t know whether
Lessig is claiming that our history of piracy has made us better off, but we
are entitled to be worried that he is implying this without offering evidence.
The tale of Larry and the Pirates ends with an important and interesting
move by Lessig. Lessig distinguishes two forms of piracy: commercial and
noncommercial.74 If I may be permitted to simplify Lessig’s point, the idea
is that commercial piracy—the wholesale illegal duplication and sale of
DVDs and CDs—is bad piracy, whereas noncommercial piracy is good
piracy, or at least “not bad.” Although Lessig consistently insists that
commercial piracy is wrong, he can’t seem to resist making arguments that
undermine his own conclusion:
We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one hundred
years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
of our existence, treated as right.
That excuse isn’t terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just
a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.75
Lessig doesn’t ask the next logical question. Even if foreign
commercial copying is legally wrong, is it really morally wrong? Less
developed countries (LDCs) prohibit copying of U.S. works in large part
because of the enormous economic pressure the United States can place on
them—through the WTO and other mechanisms. The fact that LDCs have
formally acquiesced to these pressures doesn’t really answer the doublestandards argument—that the United States is asking LDCs to meet a
74. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 63.
75. Id.
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standard that the United States itself did not meet. Moreover, Lessig’s
history-of-piracy arguments from Chapter 4 seem to be based on a similar
sort of double-standard argument.
The main point of Lessig’s discussion of piracy is to deprive the
opponents of P2P filesharing of a rhetorical weapon—the metaphoric
equation of piracy and copying. For the most part, Lessig’s stories succeed
in the task that he sets for them. Copying is not the moral equivalent of
piracy, because copying can and does bring new things of value into the
world. Stories are not arguments, however, and the implications of Lessig’s
stories are not entirely clear. From the fact that copying is not the moral
equivalent of piracy, it does not follow that copyright laws are unjustified.
Of course, Lessig concedes this, but the story-driven structure of Free
Culture makes it difficult for us to discern just what lesson we are supposed
to have learned from Larry and the Pirates.
V.

I Want My MP376

All of this history is leading somewhere, and we all know where. The
future of copyright is deeply entwined with the future of P2P filesharing. We
associate P2P filesharing with Napster and its successors, but these programs
are really just surface manifestations of the internet itself:
Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the
inventors of the Napster technology had not made any major
technological innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on
the Internet (and, arguably, off the Internet as well), Shawn Fanning
and crew had simply put together components that had been developed
independently.
The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
system. Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services
emerged to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p
service. It boasts over 100 million members.) These services’
systems are different architecturally, though not very different in
function: Each enables users to make content available to any number
of other users. With a p2p system, you can share your favorite songs
with your best friend—or your 20,000 best friends.77
Lessig’s next move is to divide the world of P2P users into four
categories, which can be summarized as follows:
A. There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
purchasing content. . . .
76. Cf. Dire Straits, Money for Nothing, on BROTHERS IN ARMS (Warner Bros. 1985).
77. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 67.
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B. There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
purchasing it. . . .
C. There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
copyrighted content that is no longer sold or that they would not have
purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. . . .
D. Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access to
content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner wants to
give away.78
Take a close look at type C. Lessig lumps together two different
groups: (i) those who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
content that is no longer sold and (ii) those who would not have purchased
because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. Given that Lessig
defines type A as those who would have purchased the downloaded music if
it were not available for free online, this categorization implies that type C(ii)
and type A exhaust the possibilities not covered by categories B, C(i), and D.
But that isn’t the case.
Both type A and type C(ii) are defined counterfactually. Type A
consists of those who would purchase music offline, if they could not get the
content for free through P2P filesharing.79 Type C(ii) consists of those who
would purchase music offline, if the off-internet transaction costs were the
same as or less than the on-internet transaction costs. But this leaves another
logical possibility: Type E (added to Lessig’s A through D) consists of those
who would not purchase music offline or online even with zero transaction
costs, so long as the price includes the royalty charged by the copyright
owner. Roughly speaking, type E consists of those who will not even pay $1
to download from iTunes (or perhaps fifty cents, if half of the iTunes price is
transaction costs).
With this distinction in mind, let’s return to Lessig’s argument:
From the perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
harmful. Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C
sharing is illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music
is good) and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
answer—and certainly much more difficult than the current rhetoric
around the issue suggests.80
This is one of the most important passages in Free Culture, but Lessig
makes this crucial argument with breathtaking speed. To assess its validity,
we need to unpack it. Notice that in describing type C in the argument,

78. Id. at 68–69.
79. Id. at 68.
80. Id. at 69 (footnote omitted).
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Lessig says “since the work is not otherwise available.” That statement is
accurate for type C(i), but not for type C(ii). Type C(ii) works are available,
but the P2P filesharer is simply not willing to pay the transaction costs. Type
E works (not included in Lessig’s typology) are available, but the P2P
filesharer would be unwilling to pay the monopoly rent (royalty), even if the
transaction costs were zero.
Now things get really interesting. What is the optimal policy for P2P
filesharers of type A, type C(ii), and type E? Type A consists of P2P
filesharers who would pay for a CD if a free copy were not available via
filesharing. The choice of legal regimes to govern P2P filesharing will not
determine whether type A users will actually get the content (the music). In
the jargon of economists, the only effect of allowing P2P filesharing for type
A users is a “wealth transfer effect.”
Type C(ii) users are those who would purchase music but for
transaction costs. The choice of legal regimes to govern P2P filesharing will
determine whether type C(ii) users actually consume music. If they must
choose between paying and going without, they will go without. Type E
consists of P2P filesharers who would not pay for music, even with zero
transaction costs, so long as the owner of the copyright charges a profitmaximizing royalty. Like type C(ii) users, if type E users must choose
between paying and going without, they will go without; unlike type C(ii)
users, type E users would forgo content even if transaction costs were zero.
Lessig’s essential point is that there is a dead welfare loss if we allocate
entitlement to the music to the copyright holder as against type C(ii) and type
E filesharers. Copyright owners do not benefit from holding the entitlement
against users of either type because these users won’t pay for CDs. Type
C(ii) and Type E users lose (if the entitlement is assigned to the copyright
owner) because they forgo consumption of music that they would enjoy.
So far, so good, but Lessig’s version of the argument is incomplete.
I’ve been going along with Lessig and treating types A, C(ii), and E as if they
were distinct categories, but this is misleading. A more illuminating story
would make it clear that we all are willing to pay different amounts for different content. If I am type A with respect to a given song (or collection of
songs), this means that the price that I am willing to pay for the content
exceeds the market price of the CD. If I am type C(ii), then the price that I
am willing to pay is below the market price of the CD but above the zero
transaction cost price. If I am type E, then the price that I am willing to pay
is below the zero-transaction-cost royalty. We might add type F, comprising
those who would accept the music file only if they were paid to do so. Any
given song (or content file, more generally) will likely have consumers of
types A, C(ii), E, and F.
The fact that different consumers are willing to pay different prices for
any given good does not create a problem for the allocation of tangible
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resources. The market establishes a price for the tangible resource, and those
who derive the greatest utility from the resource purchase it. (I am setting
the problem of wealth effects to the side.) But with intangible information
(such as the pattern of bits that make up the MP3-encoded music file), there
is no need to get the file to the consumers who will derive the greatest
benefit. That’s because consumption of information is nonrivalrous.
Everyone can have a copy. So, in the best of all possible worlds, everyone
who derives any positive utility from the content would have a copy.
But we do not live in the best of all possible worlds. Our world has the
defect that price and enforcement discrimination on the basis of demand
curves is not feasible. In an ideal world, copyright owners would sell copies
to each potential buyer at a price the buyer was willing to pay. If I am
willing to pay $50 for a copy of the Furtwängler recording of Bruckner’s
Seventh Symphony, I would be charged $50 or less. But if you were only
willing to pay $1 for the same recording, your price would be $1 or less.
That is, the owner of the copyright in the recording would be able to engage
in price discrimination on the basis of our demand curves—our willingness
to purchase at different prices.
In the actual world, however, this kind of price discrimination is
difficult or impossible for two reasons. First, the owner of the copyright
doesn’t know how much you or I are willing to pay, so the owner doesn’t
know to charge you a lower price than she charges me. Second, even if the
owner somehow did know how much we were willing to pay, it would be
difficult for her to prevent you from selling your copy to me at a price that
was higher than you were charged but lower than the price that I would be
charged.
The same point could be made about enforcement. In a better world, we
could enforce the copyright laws against type A users, but not against type
C(ii) or E users. But the legal system, like the copyright owner, lacks the
information as to which users are which. And even if the legal system had
this information, it would be difficult to prevent type E users from selling
their free copies to type A users.
So the impossibility of price and enforcement discrimination means that
we must choose between giving the copyright owner the entitlement (the
right to prevent copying) as against type A, C(ii), and E filesharers and
giving all P2P filesharers the entitlement to copy.
There is one more wrinkle that we need to add to Lessig’s story. If P2P
filesharing were eliminated by some legal regime, then the economics of forpay downloading services would change.
Demand would increase,
economies of scale would kick in, and we would expect the price per
download to fall. In other words, some users who are type C(ii) or E given
the availability of free P2P filesharing would become type A users if lower
cost, for-pay downloading were available. This is not a criticism of Lessig’s
argument but simply a supplement to it.
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Now that we’ve filled in the gaps, we can see that Lessig’s version of
the argument, although highly compressed, was essentially correct. Free P2P
filesharing has both costs and benefits. When we ask ourselves how
entitlements should be allocated, we need to look at both sides of the ledger:
[T]he question we should be asking about file sharing is how best to
preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent possible) the
wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of balance. The
law should seek that balance, and that balance will be found only with
time.81
Of course, we all know where Lessig will go next. He will argue that
the benefits of filesharing exceed the costs. He begins with the argument that
filesharing actually stimulates demand for CDs. Type B users sample new
songs, and buy more music:
We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
The “net harm” to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
networks would actually benefit music companies on balance.82
And Lessig identifies other benefits of P2P filesharing. Type C(i)
involves the P2P filesharing of music that is no longer for sale. Lessig
argues that all of type C(i) filesharing should be counted as a benefit. I think
Lessig is wrong about this. Why? Because in the absence of free P2P
filesharing, it is highly likely that for-pay downloading services for out-ofprint records and CDs would have emerged. These services could not get off
the ground given that they had to compete with free P2P filesharing. (Free is
better than cheap.) But cheap for-pay downloads would likely have
competed quite effectively with relatively expensive (and increasingly
scarce) used copies of out-of-print records and CDs.
Continuing, Lessig reinforces his argument that type C(i) filesharing is a
benefit of free P2P filesharing by asking this rhetorical question: “[I]f you
think that type C sharing should be stopped, do you think that libraries and
used book stores should be shut as well?”83 This question is partially
illuminating and partially misleading. Yes, it is true that type C(i) filesharing
is like the used book and record market in some respects, but there is an
important difference. Gearing up record plants or printing presses involves
relatively high fixed costs. So, the effective choice is between a used record
or book and no copy at all. Gearing up a download site for out-of-print CDs
and records involves very low fixed costs—so low that people are willing to
81. Id. at 73.
82. Id. at 70.
83. Id. at 72.
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do it for no compensation at all. In the absence of free P2P filesharing, used
CDs of out-of-print records would compete with low-cost downloads. So
one might well believe that type C sharing should be stopped but that
libraries and used book stores should remain open.
Lessig then turns to type D filesharing.84 Type D works are either in the
public domain or are works of which the owner of the copyright has
consented to free copying. In either case, the elimination of type D copying
should count as a cost of the legal prohibition of P2P filesharing.
So what is Lessig’s point? Given the arguments that he has made, one
might think that Lessig would come out for the legalization of P2P
filesharing. Even with all my quibbles and qualifications, it seems to me that
two of Lessig’s arguments (if correct on the facts) are compelling. If P2P
filesharing actually increases demand for CDs, then there is no reason to
restrict it—unless one could show that the optimal level of investment in
music production requires an even greater monopoly rent from music and
sound recording copyrights than was afforded by the pre-P2P regimes. (That
seems doubtful.) And, independently, if Lessig is correct that the net welfare
gains from free P2P sharing to type A, C(ii), and E users far exceed the costs
to copyright owners, then it seems highly likely that we should simply
legalize P2P filesharing. If both arguments are correct, then the case for
legalization is overwhelming.
But this does not seem to be the direction in which Lessig is heading.
After making a compelling case for legalization, Lessig seems to be
preparing the way for some sort of compromise solution. He ends the
chapter by noting that we have a “tradition” of compromise between the
interests of copyright owners and consumers.85 When the courts ruled that
cable television operators had no obligation to pay for free broadcast signals,
Congress created a mandatory license scheme.86 When courts ruled that the
music recording industry had no obligation to pay sheet music copyright
owners a royalty, Congress created a mandatory licensing scheme.87
VI. Rights Are Wrongs
After his quite analytic discussion of P2P filesharing, Lessig turns back
to storytelling. Particularly compelling is the story of Jon Else’s attempt to
get clearance for 4.5 seconds of an episode of The Simpsons that appeared on
a television set in one scene of a documentary about stagehands working on a
production of Wagner’s Ring Cycle in San Francisco.88 Else considered it a
84. Id.
85. Id. at 74–78 (“The history of American law has been a process of balance. . . . In this
adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation.”).
86. Id. at 74–75.
87. Id. at 55–57.
88. Id. at 95–99.
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small but significant touch of irony that stagehands working on Wagner’s
epic opera were watching a middle-brow cartoon backstage, and as such he
wanted to leave the detail in the final cut of his film. In the end, Else was
told that it would cost $10,000 to use the four seconds. Of course, these four
seconds were almost undoubtedly fair use.89 But if Else were sued, it would
cost even more than $10,000 to successfully assert the fair use defense. So
Else had to use special effects to replace The Simpsons in the 4.5 seconds of
his documentary.
The Else story is compelling. As was the case with the story of Jesse
Jordan, the Else story is really a story about imperfections in the litigation
system. There very well may be a case for fee-shifting for successful fair use
defenses—perhaps with a bonus to give adequate incentives for contingency
fair use defense representation. Else had another option, of course—a
declaratory relief action. This has a nifty advantage over asserting fair use
from a defensive posture. If you lose the declaratory relief action, then the
party that is unreasonably contesting fair use cannot recover anything against
you—because you haven’t yet copied.
Lessig makes it clear what he thinks the point of the Else story is:
In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory
therefore supports free culture and insulates against a permission
culture. But in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy
lines of the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is slight.
The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.90
Chapter 10 is titled Property, and it begins with the story of Jack
Valenti’s relentless and successful lobbying effort to give copyright holders
property rights that are the equal of property rights in tangible resources.
Lessig quotes Valenti, and the quotation is worth repeating:
No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable
men and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the
central theme which animates this entire debate: Creative property
owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in
all other property owners in the nation. That is the issue. That is the

89. See, e.g., Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding
that the use of 35.6 seconds of artwork displayed in a motion picture was de minimis use because it
appeared fleetingly, was obscured, and was severely out of focus); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat’l
Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that the copying of four notes and two
words from 100 musical measures and 45 words was fair use). But cf. Ringgold v. Black Entm’t
Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 78–81 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the appearance of an artistic work
in a set decoration in several brief clips of a television program totaling 26.75 seconds was not a
protected de minimus use).
90. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 99.
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question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the
debates to follow must rest.91
Lessig calls this position “extremist,”92 but I would make a different
point. Valenti (and many other IP absolutists) simply ignore the crucial
differences between information and tangible resources. Consumption of
tangible resources is rivalrous—when I drink a glass of Ridge Zinfandel, you
cannot drink that same glass of wine. Consumption of information is
nonrivalrous—my copy of an MP3 file does not make yours disappear. With
tangible resources, property rights need to be thick and perpetual or the
resource will fail to go to its highest and best use. With information, thick
and perpetual property rights prevent the resource from going to its highest
and best use.
Lessig’s strategy is different. He focuses on history, not economics. He
wants to convince us that thick and perpetual property rights in information
are outside our tradition—they would be new, radical, a break with history,
an innovation, outside the norm, unusual, and unprecedented. The first piece
of evidence that Lessig offers is the Constitution:
In the clause granting Congress the power to create “creative
property,” the Constitution requires that after a “limited time,”
Congress take back the rights that it has granted and set the “creative
property” free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this,
when the expiration of a copyright term “takes” your copyright and
turns it over to the public domain, Congress does not have any
obligation to pay “just compensation” for this “taking.”93
So, Lessig concludes, Valenti’s call for thick and perpetual property
rights in information goes against our constitutional tradition:
The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to be
treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a change in
our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners should be
accorded the same rights as every other property-right owner. He is
effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution itself.94
Lessig is right. Perpetual intellectual property rights would require a
constitutional change. Of course, that doesn’t settle the question of whether
perpetual copyright would be a good idea. Recall that Lessig himself took a
rather cavalier attitude towards tradition in his discussion of the cujus est
91. Id. at 117 (quoting Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 65
(1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti)).
92. Id. at 118.
93. Id. at 119–20.
94. Id. at 120.
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solum doctrine in property law.95 If common sense revolted at the idea of
limited copyright terms, then Lessig would presumably admit that the
Constitution should be changed.
VII. Laws, Markets, Norms, and Architecture
At this point, Lessig shifts gears and pulls out a model. There are, he
says, four modalities of regulation:
1. Law—the constitution, statutes, regulations, and common law.96
2. Market—the operation of property and pricing.97
3. Norms—social attitudes enforced through informal sanctions and
rewards.98
4. Architecture—the software or hardware that determines what is
technologically possible (speed pumps and the layered nature of the
Internet are both “architecture” in this sense).99
Lessig then deploys the model to explain how the internet has affected
the way law, market, norms, and architecture interact to regulate copying:
The law limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing
penalties on those who copy and share content. Those penalties are
reinforced by technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
(architecture) and expensive to copy and share content (market).
Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all recognize—
kids, for example, taping other kids’ records. These uses of
copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms of our
society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with this form of
infringement.100
And Lessig argues that, pre-internet, the four modalities were in some
sort of rough balance, but that the internet upset that balance:
Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s
and p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes
dramatically, as does the constraint of the market. And as both the
market and architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile
on. The happy balance (for the [copyright] warriors, at least) of life
before the Internet becomes an effective state of anarchy after the
Internet.101
95. Id. at 1–3; see supra notes 33–42 and accompanying text.
96. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 121.
97. Id. at 122.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 125.
101. Id.
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So it is not surprising that the content industries argued that all four
modalities should be brought to bear to reinforce copyright in response to the
internet:
In response to the changes the Internet had effected, the White Paper
[prepared by the Commerce Department] argued (1) Congress should
strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to
develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should
educate kids to better protect copyright.102
Lessig argues that the architecture of the internet (or digitization,
because the same effect would have occurred without the internet) changes
the relationship between use and copying. Pre-internet “use” did not require
copying, but after the internet, Lessig claims, using information requires
copying the information:
Before the Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times,
there would be no plausible copyright-related argument that the
copyright owner could make to control that use of her book.
Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read the
book once, ten times, or every night before you went to bed. None of
those instances of use—reading—could be regulated by copyright law
because none of those uses produced a copy.
But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book only
once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the copyright
owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the accidental feature
of copyright law that triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if
you read the book ten times and the license says you may read it only five
times, then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the fifth
time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the copyright owner’s
wish.103
If you are reading this Review on Westlaw or Lexis or on the internet,
you are reading a new copy. And if you download the Review to disk, you
make another copy. If you open that copy, your computer creates yet another
copy. Digitization multiplies copies. Every time a digital copy is used,
another digital copy (or two or three) is produced. And digitization creates
the possibility that the creators of digital works can build control into the
work itself. Lessig gives the frightening example of the permissions that can
be built into an Adobe eBook:
[T]he Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls “permissions”—as if
the publisher has the power to control how you use these works. For
102. Id. at 126.
103. Id. at 143–44.
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works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have the
power—up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not under
copyright, there is no such copyright power. When my e-book of
Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text
selections into the memory every ten days, what that really means is
that the eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use
the book on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would
enable.104
Encryption and digital rights management added to the
anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA)105 give the proprietors of digital works the power to control fair
use—to make fair use impossible without the deployment of illegal circumvention technologies. This point, while familiar to copyright scholars, has
not yet sunk in with the public. Lessig does a fabulous job of making this
point vivid and real. The architectural and legal changes made in response to
P2P filesharing and the threat posed by digitization to copyright are like
DDT in the ecology of creativity. Digital rights management plus the
DMCA plus media concentration threatens the vibrancy of our culture.

VIII. Copyrights and Copynorms
One of the most important points that Lessig makes in Free Culture
concerns the mismatch between copyrights and copynorms. Copyright law
says that the unauthorized P2P filesharing of copyrighted works is illegal.
Copynorms say that using P2P technologies is just fine. We might call this
the “normalization” of illegality. Here is how Lessig puts it:
As my colleague Charlie Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year
law schools admit thousands of students who have illegally
downloaded music, illegally consumed alcohol and sometimes drugs,
illegally worked without paying taxes, illegally driven cars. These are
kids for whom behaving illegally is increasingly the norm. And then
we, as law professors, are supposed to teach them how to behave
ethically—how to say no to bribes, or keep client funds separate, or
honor a demand to disclose a document that will mean that your case
is over. Generations of Americans—more significantly in some parts
of America than in others, but still, everywhere in America today—
can’t live their lives both normally and legally, since “normally”
entails a certain degree of illegality.106

104. Id. at 151 (footnote omitted).
105. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
106. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 201.
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This point is incredibly important. As Lessig says, it gives us a choice:
Either get tough and really enforce the laws or change them. Although I am
attracted to Lessig’s argument, I also see some weaknesses. In particular, it
is difficult to prove or predict the complex causal chains that result when
there is a mismatch between norms and laws. Yes, it seems plausible that
turning millions of citizens into criminals would undermine respect for the
law, but is this really the case? Perhaps ordinary citizens are capable of
distinguishing between those laws that cohere with social norms and those
that don’t. Thus, criminalizing P2P filesharing might actually sensitize
millions of Americans to the phenomenon of overcriminalization—using the
law to criminalize behavior that is accepted by prevailing social norms. Is it
necessarily the case that this is a bad thing? I believe it is, but I don’t know
how to prove that thesis.
Copynorms are important for another reason, which Free Culture barely
touches upon. When there is a mismatch between social norms and legal
norms, then the enforcement of legal norms may become difficult or
impossible. Nearly two-thirds of P2P users report that they simply do not
care that P2P filesharing is unlawful.107 Of course, the law can deter
copyright violations by threats of financial penalties or imprisonment, but
contrary social norms have a way of undermining such enforcement efforts.
Prosecutors are unlikely to view prosecution of teenagers and college
students as a high priority—given the social perception that their use of P2P
filesharing is normal and acceptable behavior. Even civil actions may be
undermined by judges or juries who simply do not believe that P2P
filesharing is a serious wrong. One of the great virtues of Lessig’s norm
entrepreneurship is that it explicitly focuses our attention on the crucial
importance of copynorms to the future of copyright law.
IX. Eldred v. Ashcroft
Lessig argued Eldred v. Ashcroft108 in the Supreme Court. He lost, but
many readers will be intrigued by Free Culture because it contains an
extensive postmortem on the case. Eldred was about the Copyright Term
Extension Act (CTEA),109 the eleventh extension of copyright terms in forty
years. Because of the CTEA, virtually no works will pass into the public
domain until the year 2019. That’s because when Congress extends
107. Memoranda from Mary Madden & Amanda Lenhart, Music Downloading, File-Sharing
and Copyright, Pew Internet & American Life Project (July 2003) (“Data gathered from Pew
Internet & American Life Project surveys fielded during March - May of 2003 show that a striking
67% of Internet users who download music say they do not care about whether the music they have
downloaded
is
copyrighted.”),
available
at
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/
PIP_Copyright_Memo.pdf.
108. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
109. Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
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copyright terms, it usually does so both prospectively to works not yet
created, and retroactively, to works that are already in existence. Since
Congress has done this multiple times, Lessig argues that Congress has
violated the constitutional requirement that copyright terms be for “limited
times”:110 “If every time a copyright is about to expire, Congress has the
power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve what the Constitution
plainly forbids—perpetual terms ‘on the installment plan,’ as Professor Peter
Jaszi so nicely put it.”111
Lessig then turns back the clock and takes us inside the reasoning that
led him to argue Eldred as he did. Lessig believed that the Rehnquist Court
might well strike the CTEA down. His reasoning was based in part on the
so-called New Federalism cases in which the Court struck down the Gun
Free School Zones Act and the Violence Against Women Act on the basis
that these statutes exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution.112 Lessig argued that the CTEA similarly exceeded
Congress’s power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, and that it should
therefore be found unconstitutional.113
And there certainly was a connection between the issue in Eldred and
the New Federalism cases, but there were differences as well. When the
Supreme Court struck down the federal statutes at issue in Lopez and
Morrison, states were free to fill in the gap. But the states would not have
been free to act in the gap left open if Lessig had persuaded the Court in
Eldred. States could not extend copyright terms, either prospectively or
retrospectively. The New Federalism cases are about limiting congressional
power, but they are also about enhancing state power. In other words, there
are principled distinctions between the New Federalism cases and Eldred.
Lessig then makes an important point about commercial value and the
public domain. Lessig states that retroactive copyright extension applies to
all works, whether they are being exploited commercially or not and that
most of the works that would now be entering the public domain have no
commercial value.114 In fact, that’s a massive understatement. Only a tiny
fraction of the works that are covered by the CTEA have any commercial
value at all. Almost all of the films, novels, magazines, newspapers, sound
recordings, and other works from the 1920s are entirely dormant. Indeed,

110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
111. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 215–16.
112. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the Gun Free School Zones
Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Violence Against Women
Act).
113. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 219–20.
114. Id. at 221.
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many of these properties now have fragmented or untraceable ownership.115
But the CTEA effectively prevents these commercially worthless works from
being digitized and stored for posterity. Lessig doesn’t use this phrase, but I
will: This is a crime against human culture. It is shocking and even evil.
Lessig then arrives at the great obstacle to his challenge to retroactive
extensions of copyright—historical practice:
The argument on the government’s side came down to this:
Congress has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
government claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
There was some truth to the government’s claim, but not much. We
certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in 1831
and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
existing terms regularly—eleven times in forty years.
But this “consistency” should be kept in perspective. Congress
extended existing terms once in the first hundred years of the
Republic. It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty.
Those rare extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of
extending existing terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the
past, that restraint was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of
extensions; there was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This
Court had not hesitated to intervene where Congress was in a similar
cycle of extension. There was no reason it couldn’t intervene here.116
Lessig underestimates the power of the historical practice argument. The
role of precedent and practice in constitutional theory is much disputed.
Some believe that historical practice is of virtually no relevance to
constitutional meaning. We must do what the Constitution says—it is
argued—and the fact that the Constitution has been violated for a very long
time is no excuse for continuing violations. Intellectually, that is a powerful
position. Of course, many constitutional theorists disregard historical
practice for a quite different reason. If you are a constitutional progressive
and believe that the living Constitution should be an instrument for the
promotion of social progress, then you won’t care much for historical
practice. But the Supreme Court does care about historical practice. Given
that retroactive extensions have been around for more than 170 years, the
Court would be very unlikely to strike them down, so long as the
Constitution could be reasonably construed to permit them. And Lessig’s
problem was that the Constitution could be construed to permit retroactive
115. Id. at 221–22 (recognizing that only 2% of copyrighted work produced between 1923 and
1943 has any commercial value and attributing the difficulty of determining the ownership of these
works to the lack of a coherent list of copyright owners from this time).
116. Id. at 236.
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extensions—so long as there is some enforceable upper limit beyond which
Congress cannot go, retroactive extensions are consistent with the notion of
“limited times.” I think that Lessig’s litigation strategy was brilliant, and I
think that he had a chance to win. But with the benefit of hindsight, I now
believe that the focus on retroactivity and the short shrift given to historical
practice was a mistake.117
Lessig had another option available. He could have argued that
Congress had done something unprecedented; it had, for the very first time,
exceeded the constitutional requirement that copyright be granted for limited
times. But isn’t 120 years or the author’s life plus 70 years a “limited
time?”118 I don’t think so. I believe that the phrase “limited times” must be
interpreted in context, that is, in the context of granting rights to authors.
Authors are humans; they live for decades, not centuries. Terms that are in
excess of the longest human lives are not “limited times” in this context.119
X.

Back to the Future

After telling the tale of Eric Eldred, Lessig actually has a proposal to
make. He suggests that we might require a $1 registration fee to continue a
copyright after fifty years.120 This is a terrific idea, although given Lessig’s
arguments, it is surprisingly modest. First, it is unclear why Lessig would
allow a fifty-year period before requiring reregistration. Reregistration could
be required periodically—perhaps as frequently as every ten years starting
ten years after the initial registration, and the fee could be nontrivial (perhaps
$100 indexed for inflation in $25 increments).
Perhaps the reason for Lessig’s modesty was his realization that even a
very modest proposal faced tremendous political obstacles. Lessig’s
proposal got quite a bit of attention,121 but the MPAA squashed it like a
bug.122 The MPAA offered a variety of reasons for their opposition to the
reregistration requirement,123 but the real reason is quite simple. Inevitably,
someone will screw up, and a valuable motion picture will pass into the
117. There is an irony here. In Eldred, Lessig gave tradition and historical practice short shrift.
In Free Culture, Lessig overplays the role of tradition and historical practice.
118. Congress has provided that a copyright shall “endure[] for a term consisting of the life of
the author and 70 years after the author’s death.” 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
119. Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 27–38 (2002).
120. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 248–49.
121. See, e.g., Brian Krebs, Bill Seeks to Loosen Copyright Law’s Grip,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM,
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=
article&contentId=A32488-2003Jun25 (June 25, 2003); Steve Forbes, Fact and Comment, FORBES,
Mar. 31, 2003, at 27–28 (praising Lessig’s proposal as a “[p]atently good idea”), available at
http://www.forbes.com/global/2003/0331/009.html.
122. See LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 253–54 (explaining that after a draft bill of
Lessig’s proposal was submitted, the MPAA lobbied successfully against it).
123. Id.
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public domain when the fifty-year period expires. Lessig’s proposal offered
nothing to the film industry, and it imposed a small (but not insignificant)
cost. So it went down in flames.
The rest of Lessig’s positive program is contained in the afterword of
Free Culture. His vision of the future begins with the model offered by the
open-source software movement:
[I]n 1984, [Richard] Stallman began a project to build a free operating
system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds’s
“Linux” kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating
system.
Stallman’s technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
Software Foundation’s GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
anyone building upon GPL’d software would have to make their
buildings free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an
ecology of code would develop that remained free for others to build
upon. His fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code
was a byproduct.
Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom
that was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of
licenses that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively
reclaiming a space where free software would survive. He was
actively protecting what before had been passively guaranteed.124
The open-source software movement is the model for Lessig’s Creative
Commons:
The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
increasing control effected through law and technology.
Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable
copyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by
making it easy for people to build upon other people’s work, by
making it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take
and build upon their work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable
descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible.125
Why will for-profit publishers, the recording industry, and the motion
picture industry give away their product? Lessig suggests that the free
124. Id. at 280.
125. Id. at 282.
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downloads might stimulate sales enough to actually increase the profits of
publishers, but he offers only anecdotal evidence in support of this
conclusion.126 While it seems quite likely that free digital giveaways might
play some role in the promotion of motion pictures, music, and books, it also
seems unlikely that the giveaway will become the norm.
Lessig makes a variety of other proposals, including, importantly,
shorter copyright terms. Lessig also proposes some kind of mandatory
licensing scheme for content that is no longer “in print.” And what about the
P2P problem? Lessig endorses the kind of scheme suggested in various
forms by Neil Netanel, William Fisher, and others:
The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been floated
by Harvard law professor William Fisher. Fisher suggests a very
clever way around the current impasse of the Internet. Under his plan,
all content capable of digital transmission would (1) be marked with a
digital watermark (don’t worry about how easy it is to evade these
marks; as you’ll see, there’s no incentive to evade them). Once the
content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop (2) systems to
monitor how many items of each content were distributed. On the
basis of those numbers, then (3) artists would be compensated. The
compensation would be paid for by (4) an appropriate tax.127
Lessig believes that if adopted this system would eventually fade away,
replaced by some form of the iTunes model, with prices driven down by
competition. Why use iTunes when P2P filesharing is free? Because iTunes
is easier to use. If prices go down—to fifty cents or twenty-five cents or
even ten cents per song—then the incentive to use the for-pay systems, rather
than P2P systems, will grow. In this regard, it is very important to remember
that price competition does work for copyrighted works. In the days before
P2P filesharing, if the latest CD by the most popular group cost too much,
consumers would simply purchase another CD. In the new world of for-pay
online music, there will be price competition because there is substantial
cross-elasticity of demand between and among various musical recordings.
XI. And in the End
Free Culture is an easy read but not an easy book to understand in a
deep way. Lessig tells lots of stories, some of which I have recounted, but
most of which I’ve passed over in this Review. The stories are well told and
moving, but it is not always easy to be sure about their morals. The moral of
a story is the argument for which it stands, and unless the moral is spelled out

126. See, e.g., id. at 112 (providing an example of a for-profit stock-movie company that, after
making “a significant chunk [of the movie clips] available for free,” saw its “stock footage sales
[go] up dramatically”).
127. Id. at 301 (footnote omitted).
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with precision, it will usually be ambiguous. Free Culture is a deeply
ambiguous book. It is very clear what Lessig is against. He is against the
big media companies. He is against the expansion of copyright. He is
against digital lockup of content through encryption backed by the
anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
Lessig’s stories are designed to move us to be against those things as well.
What Lessig opposes is clear, but why and what he favors instead are
much murkier. There are paragraphs and even chapters in Free Culture that
make interesting claims, but Lessig does not attempt to build a sustained,
precise argument to compliment his stories. Lessig does make lots of
proposals, but they come at the very end of the book and they are
underdeveloped (and perhaps more importantly, they are not analyzed and
supported by the kinds of arguments that economists, legal scholars, or
policymakers need).
Books are aimed at audiences. As a norm entrepreneur, Lessig has
aimed Free Culture at a very broad audience. While Free Culture is a
sophisticated book, aimed at an educated and literate elite, it is not an
academic book or even the equivalent of a serious policy paper aimed at
Congress. He is arguing his case to the jury and not the judge. So Free
Culture needs to be assessed on its own terms. It would be grossly unfair to
judge Free Culture by the standards of the academy when the book was not
written for academics.
Does Free Culture succeed on its own terms? Lessig is right, I think, to
believe that stories are the keys to persuasion. And Free Culture offers up a
brilliant collection of stories that engage our passions and pluck at our
heartstrings. The broad rhetorical strategy of Free Culture has three
elements. First and foremost, Lessig wants to show how an excess of
intellectual property can lead to results that seem silly, pernicious, or wrong.
Second, Lessig wants to argue that our legal traditions actually sanction
unauthorized copying. Third, Lessig wants to show that the social forces that
are pushing for further expansion of copyright, the big media companies, are
the bad guys. Lessig’s stories drive each of these three points home. When
read by its intended audience, Free Culture is likely to score points for its
cause.
Free Culture largely accomplishes the task that it set for itself, but that
is not the end of the story. There is a distinction between effective rhetoric
and responsible rhetoric. One can persuade with good arguments and with
bad arguments. Does Free Culture achieve its rhetorical effects using stories
and arguments that illuminate the future of copyright? Or did Lessig go over
the top and take the cheap shots? As much as I admire Lessig and his book,
the answer to these questions must be, “A little bit of both.” Free Culture
tells stories that are deeply illuminating, but it also avails itself of stories that
seem calculated to drive home ad hominem attacks. The struggle over the
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future of copyright can be painted as the good guys versus the bad guys, but
that way of framing the issues does little to enlighten and much to obscure
the real and very tough questions that need to be answered.
Yet the rhetoric of Free Culture does not exist in a vacuum. This
Review is obviously not the place for a careful examination of the rhetoric
employed on both sides of the copyfight, but I can offer my own opinion.
And it is my opinion that there have been plenty of rhetorical excesses on all
sides of the copyright debates. In this context, Free Culture is actually a
model of restraint. Lessig manages to present an account that, while
opinionated, is nuanced, fair, and balanced given the overheated rhetoric that,
in my judgment, is typical.
Read Free Culture. If you are an intellectual property scholar or
lawyer, you may be frustrated by the gaps and leaps in Lessig’s arguments,
but you will be enlightened and entertained. If you are not an intellectual
property specialist, then you are in for a wild ride. Lessig has written an
intelligent, entertaining, and moving book. Oh, and by the way, you can
download it for free.128

128. Larry Lessig, Free Content, at http://www.free-culture.cc/freecontent/ (last visited Feb. 21,
2005).

